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PART II 
Public Law 
CHAPTER 9 
Constitutional Law 
JOHN D. O'REILLY, JR. 
§9.I. Right to fair yet speedy trial. Commonwealth v. Geagan1 
raised, among a number of other issues, a knotty problem as to the 
constitutional right of a defendant in a criminal case to a trial that is 
at once fair and speedy.2 The case grew out of the 1950 robbery at 
the Boston terminal of Brink's, Incorporated, when the sum of $1,219,-
000 was taken. The defendants were arrested and indicted in January, 
1956. They filed special pleas and motions to quash, alleging that 
the district attorney and "other officials of the Commonwealth" had 
issued news releases and other statements about the case that had re-
sulted in widespread publication in newspapers and in radio and 
television broadcasts of sensational material which was calculated to 
convince the public in general, and prospective jurors in particular, 
of the guilt of the defendants. These publications were "mostly" 3 
dated between January 12 and the end of February, 1956. The mo-
tions and pleas were heard on May 17 and 29, and June 1 and 4, 1956, 
and were severally denied on the latter date, at which time the trial 
was set for August 6, 1956. The trial, which began on the assigned 
date and lasted for several weeks, resulted in conviction. The judg-
ments of conviction were affirmed. 
In dealing with the defendants' point based upon pretrial publicity, 
JOHN D. O'REILLY, JR., is Professor of Law at Boston College Law School and a 
member of the Bars of Massachusetts, the District of Columbia, and the United 
States Supreme Court. 
§9.1. 11959 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1107, 159 N.E.2d (170. The Supreme Court of the 
United States denied certiorari on November 16, 1959,361 U.S. 80. 
2 The defendants relied upon Mass. Con5t., Declaration of Rights, Arts. I, XI, 
XII; U.S. Const., Amend. XIV; and a portion of the Civil Rights Act, 18 U.S.C. 
§241 (1952). 
II 1959 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1107, 1116, 159 N.E.2d 870, 880·881. 
1
O'Reilly: Chapter 9: Constitutional Law
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1959
80 1959 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETIS LAW §9.1 
the Supreme Judicial Court seemingly rested its decision upon the con-
ventional 4 ground that the trial judge, without abuse of discretion, 
might have found in June that the effect of the publicity of January 
and February either had abated or would abate by August to an extent 
sufficient to permit a fair trial.li 
The Court pointed out that the defendants had declined to move 
for a continuance6 and it ruled that even if there was prejudicial pub-
licity it did not·follow that the defendants could never be brought to 
trial.7 The opinion recited that on August 6, 1956, the date of the 
opening of the trial, the defendants filed further special pleas and 
motions to quash "which related to newspaper publications in the 
interval since the first special pleadings." As to these it was said, 
"These raise no new point and are governed by what has been herein-
before said." 8 This might be construed as a ruling that the defend-
ants, not having waived their right to a speedy trial, would not be 
heard to complain that pretrial publicity made their trial unfair. 
A reading of the record,9 however, reveals that the August 6 pleas 
and motions were based upon newspaper articles published during the 
month of June, so that the more likely meaning of the Court was that 
the trial judge could properly have concluded that the effect of these, 
as well as of the January and February publications, was sufficiently 
dissipated by the time the jury was selected to permit a fair trial. The 
case in this respect is distinguishable from Delaney v. United States}O 
in which the defense motions for continuance were supported by affi-
davits showing widespread publicity adverse to the defendant con-
tinuing up to the time of the trial. 
At one of the pretrial hearings in the Geagan case there was some 
discussion, in a colloquy between the trial judge and counsel,11 as to 
whether, if there were an attendant atmosphere of prejudicial pub-
licity, the defendants might be required to elect to waive either the 
right to speedy trial or the right to fair trial. There was no ruling 
on the point, nor does there appear to be any reported case in which 
the point has been decided. At least one court, however, has ruled that 
a defendant, by proceeding to trial without objecting on the basis of 
"In Stroble v. California, 343 V.S. 181, 72 Sup. Ct. 599, 96 L. Ed. 872 (1952), a 
"spate of newspaper publicity." engendered in part by the prosecutor's release to 
the press of a confession of the accused some six weeks prior to the trial. was held 
not to deprive the defendant of due process in the absence of a showing "that any 
community prejudice ever existed or in any way affected the deliberation ·of the 
jury." 
I) 1959 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1107. 1118. 159 N.E.2d 870. 881. 
61959 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1117. 159 N.E.2d at 881. 
7 Ibid. In this respect. the Court followed Delaney v. United States. 199 F.2d 
107. Ill. 112 (1st Cir. 1952). where denial of a motion to dismiss indictments was 
sustained. although denial of a motion for continuance was held erroneous. 
81959 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1107. 1118. 159 N.E.2d 870. 881-882. 
11 Summary of Record and Assignment of Errors. Vol. 2. p. 687. 
10 199 F.2d 107 (1st Cir. 1952). 
11 See Brief for Appellants. pp. 165-167. 
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current adverse publicity, must be deemed to have waived whatever 
rights he may have had in thepremises.12 
Courts and legislatures generally seem not disposed to face up 
squarely and realistically to the problem of reconciling the constitu-
tional ideal of trial before a truly fair and impartial fact finder with 
the fact of pretrial publicity which, to greater or lesser extent, but 
always to some extent, tends to affect the judgment of prospective 
jurors.1S The prevalent judicial attitude, well exemplified by the 
present' case, is one of recognizing that, in certain circumstances, it 
is impossible to give as fair and impartial a trial as would be desirable, 
but resolving to give as fair and impartial a trial as can be given in 
the circumstances. It is probable that the problem is not one which 
courts can effectively solve, but is one that calls upon other agencies 
of social control to devise ways and means' of eliminating the circuttl-
stances that tend to frustrate fair and orderly law administration.14 
§9.2. Substantive due process: Rights of the individual. An ad-
visory opinionl and a decision2 of the 1959 SURVEY year have revived 
the uncertainty as to how far notions of individual freedom of choice 
will be indulged in Massachusetts as limitations upon the scope of 
legislative power. 
It is familiar history that the early years of the present century were 
characterized by a practically universal judicial tendency to read into 
constitutions, both state and' federal, provisions for the inviolability 
of ali exaggerated class of "natural rights." 8 These rights could be 
subordinated, by legislation, to dramatically enough portrayed claims 
of public health and safety,4 but "liberty of contract [was] the general 
rule and restraint the exception." II Even after the Supreme Court of 
the United States began to relax the application of this extreme con-
cept of individual liberty, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
12 Palakiko v. Harper. 209 F.2d 75, 98 (9th Cir. 1953). 
13 See Justices Jackson .and Frankfurter, concurring specially in Shepherd v. 
Florida, 341 U.S. 50, 7I Sup. Ct. 549, 95 L. Ed. 740 (1951), and Mr. Justice Frank-
flIrter, dissenting. in Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 198, 72 Sup. Ct. 599, 608, 
96 L. Ed. 872, 885 (1952). The fact that Mr. Justice Jackson did not join in the 
dissent in the latter case may indicate his view that there was a significant differ-
ence of degree in the effect of publicity in the two cases. 
14 See Note, Controlling Press and Radio Influence on Trials, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 
840 (1950). See also the separate opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Maryland 
v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc .• 338 U.S. 912, 70 Sup. Ct. 252. 94 L. Ed. 562 (1950). 
§9.2. 1 Opinion of the Justices, 337 Mass. 796. 151 N.E.2d 631 (1958). 
2 Paquette v. Fall River. 338 Mass. 368,155 N.E.2d 775 (1959). 
'8 See Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 35 Sup. Ct. 240, 59 L. Ed. 441 (1915); Lochner 
v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 25 Sup. Ct. 539, 49 L. Ed. 937 (1905); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 
165 U.S. 578. 17 Sup. Ct. 427. 41 L. Ed. 832 (1897). 
4 See Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 28 Sup. Ct. 324, 52 L. Ed. 551 (1908): Holden 
v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 18 Sup. Ct. 383, 42 L. Ed. 780 (1898). 
II Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 546, 43 Sup. Ct. 394, 397. 67 L. Ed. 
785, 791 (1923). 
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continued to apply the principle rigidly.6 This was explained upon 
the ground that the Court must observe the limitations of the state, as 
well as the federal, constitution.7 
In 1934 the United States Supreme Court began8 a line of decisions 
that culminated in repudiation, not mere relaxation, of the doctrine 
that the legislature is impotent save in exceptional cases.9 There was 
thus substituted for the doctrine that gave primacy to "liberty of con-
tract" Iii a test of reasonableness of legislation, under which a heavy 
burden was cast upon the party questioning the validity of the legis-
lature's judgment.11 
While the new doctrine of substantive due process of law was de-
veloping in the Supreme Court of the United States, it had little effect 
upon the Massachusetts Court. In 1938 the justices rendered an ad-
visory opinion12 upon a proposal to restrict the days and hours that 
barbershops may be kept open for business. The opinion advised 
that the proposal would, if enacted, be unconstitutional because it 
would unduly inhibit the freedom of barbershop proprietors. As to 
the recitals in the bill's preamble concerning the impact of barbershop 
operation upon public health, it was considered adequate to note that 
the bill did not limit the hours of work of individual barbers, but 
restricted only the hours of operation of shops, which might employ 
more than one shift of barbers. 
In recent years the Massachusetts Court's view of substantive due 
process limitations upon legislative power has become more closely 
attuned to that of the United States Supreme Court. The Supreme 
Judicial Court has found no constitutional obstacles to the exercise 
of legislative power to provide for urban redevelopment programs,18 
to prohibit advertising by dental laboratories to the general public,14 
to require conformity to aesthetic standards in private buildings,1I5 
8 Compare Rast v. Van Deman" Lewis Co., 240 U.S. 842, 36 Sup. Ct. 370, 60 
L. Ed. 679 (1916), with Sperry" Hutchinson Co. v. Director of Necessaries of Life, 
307 Mass. 408, 30 N.E.2d 269 (1940); Daniel v. Family Security Life Insurance Co., 
336 U.S. 220, 69 Sup. Ct. 550, 93 L. Ed. 632 (1949), with Opinion of the Justices, 
322 Mass. 755, 79 N.E.2d 883 (1948). 
7 See Lowell Gas Co. v. Department of Public Utilities, 324 Mass. SO, 84 N.E.2d 
811 (1949). 
8 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 54 Sup. Ct. 505, 78 L. Ed. 940 (1934). 
9 See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 75 Sup. Ct. 98, 99 L. Ed. 27 (1954); Day-
~. e Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 842 U.S. 421, 72 Sup. Ct. 405, 96 L. Ed. 469 (1952). o This doctrine is, of course, not to be confused with the Thomistic jus naturale. 
. Snee, Leviathan at the Bar of Justice, in Government Under Law 92, n.2 
(Sutherland ed. 1956). 
11 See Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.s. 483, 75 Sup. Ct. 461, 99 L. Ed. 
563 (1955).' 
12 Opinion of the Justices, 300 Mass. 615, 14 N.E.2d 953 (1938). 
13 Papadinis v. Somerville, 331 Mass. 627, 121 N.E.2d 714 (1954). 
14 Perlow v. Board of Dental Examiners, 332 Mass. 682, 127 N.E.2d S06 (1955). 
15 Opinions of the Justices, 3311 Mass. 773, 128 N.E.2d 557 (1955); lIlIlI Mass. 78l1, 
128 N.E.2d 5611 (1955). 
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and to authorize resale price maintenance for trade-marked commodi-
ties.16 
In the light of these developments it was not surprising that the 
Court sustained an ordinance setting minimum standards for occu-
pancy of dwelling facilities.17 The ordinance required that such fa-
cilities be equipped with hot water, lavatory basin and bathtubs or 
showers, room heating facilities and electrical outlets, and conform to 
room-area standards and the like. The record showed that about 5 
percent of the dwelling accommodations in the city were "cold water 
flats," which had been constructed and used prior to the enactment of 
the ordinance in 1955. In rejecting the landowners' argument against 
the validity of the ordinance the Court, through Chief Justice Wilkins, 
stated: 
It is true that the determination by the Legislature, or here by 
the city, "as to what is a proper exercise of its police powers is 
not final or conclusive, but is subject to the supervision of the 
courts." ... \But the decision as to what measures are necessary 
for the preservation of life, health and morals is in the first place 
a matter for the legislative authority, and every presumption must 
be made in favor of the validity of statutes or ordinances enacted 
to further those objectives.' ... 
There are no findings in the master's report which rebut the 
presumption of validity. That there is no finding that the plain-
tiffs' "cold water flats" constitute a menace to the health, safety, 
or morals of the public is without significance.1s 
Exactly six months before this decision, however, the justices ren-
dered an advisory opinion19 in a second barbershop case, in which 
they expressly "adopt[ed] and reaffirm[ed] the reasoning" of the 1938 
opinion20 in which they had advised that a legislative limitation of the 
hours of operation of barbershops would be invalid. Both in their 
own recital 21 that such a limitation "was an unreasonable interfer-
ence with the pursuit of a vocation" and in their implied approval 
of a number of opinions of other state courts which reached the same 
result,22 there are indications that the justices have not completely 
departed from the pseudo-natural-law approach to problems of sub-
stantive due process of law.28 
16 General Electric Co. v. Kimball Jewelers, Inc., 333 Mass. 665, 132 N.E.2d 652 
(1956). 
17 Paquette v. Fall River, 338 Mass. 368, 155 N.E.2d 775 (1959). For further 
comment on this case, see §12.8 infra. 
18338 Mass. at 376, 155 N.E.2d at 780. 
19 Opinion of the Justices, 337 Mass. 796, 151 N.E.2d 631 (1958). 
20 Opinion of the Justices, 300 Mass. 615, 14 N.E.2d 953 (1938). 
21337 Mass. 796, 798, 151 N.E.2d 631,632 (1958). 
22 Ibid. 
2S It may be that, in dealing with barbers, the Court feels bound to accord great 
constitutional weight to their economic interests by reason of its pre·1954 decision 
in Saveall v. Demers, 322 Mass. 70, 76 N.E.2d 12 (1947). 
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. Limitation of hours and days of operation of barbershops generally 
seeks to find its justification in the theory that it facilitates inspection 
in aid of enforcement of sanitation regulations.24 The argument runs 
that, if barbershops are allowed to keep open only during hours when 
inspectors are on duty, the danger of violation of regulations is re-
duced. One of the few courts that have addressed themselves to this 
phase of the problem dismissed the point out of hand, remarking that 
inspection can be carried on equally well when shops are closed as 
when they are open.25 
Other courts, exhibiting a clearer understanding of the factual 
problem, have posed a very narrow question as to the degree of defer-
ence to which a legislative judgment is entitled. Thus, according to 
the Supreme Court of Indiana, "It is absurd to hold that facility of 
inspection, or in other words, the convenience of the inspector, who 
visits a shop perhaps four times a year, is sufficient reason for shorten-
ing, or lengthening, the daily hours of business." 26 But the other side 
of the coin is shown in an opinion of the Supreme Court of New 
Jersey, where it was said: "To allow barber shops to remain open to 
the public at all hours of the night might well be regarded as render-
ing ready and adequate inspection inconvenient or difficult or even 
impossible, and consequently detrimental to public health. Such 
considerations are for the fair determination of the municipal authori-
ties, and we cannot say that the regulation in the instant case is un-
reasonable." 27 
Whatever the merits of the issue drawn between the Indiana and 
New Jersey courts, the drawing of the issue points up the dangers' of 
basing declarations of limitations on legislative power upon broad 
(sometimes even extravagant) generalizations of individual rights in 
the abstract. More particularly, it may point up the need for im-
provement in the Massachusetts advisory opinion procedure, whether 
by way of extending the practice of inserting informative preambles 
in legislative bills, or requiring greater care and precision in the draft-
ing of questions put to the justices, or giving interested persons oppor-
tunity to render assistance to the justices in the form of briefs amici 
curiae or otherwise. 
§9.3. Motor vehicle excise tax: Vehicles used in interstate com-
merce. The validity of the Motor Vehicle Excise Tax Act,l as applied 
24 The 1958 prpposal which was dealt with in the advisory opinion was not 
framed on this theory, although the 1938 proposal was. The justices might well 
have contented themselves with only dealing (as they did in part, 337 Mass. 796, 
798-799, 151 N.E.2d 631, 633 (1958», with the problem of delegation. As the bill 
was submitted, however, it might have presented some difficult questions as to the 
propriety of legal regulation of competition among barbers. 
25 People ex reI. Pinellov. Leadbitter, 194 Misc. 481, 85 N.Y.S.2d 287 (Sup. Ct. 
1948), aU'd, 275 App. Div. 864, 89 N.Y.S.2d 924 (2d Dept. 1949), aU'd, 301 N.Y. 695, 
95 N.E.2d 51 (1950). 
26 State Board of Barber Examiners v. Cloud, 220 Ind. 552, 555, 44 N.E.2d 972, 
977 (1942). 
27 Falco v. Atlantic City, 99 N.J.L.19. 21.122 Atl. 61.0,.611 (Sup. Ct. 1923). 
§9.3. 1 G.L., c. 60A. 
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to interstate buses, was brought into question in O'Brien v. State Tax 
Commission.2 The statute imposes upon every vehicle registered under 
G.L., c. 90, an ad valorem tax at the average state rate for the calendar 
year. The trustee in reorganzation of a motor carrier, several of whose 
vehicles, although principally garaged in Hartford, Connecticut, were 
registered in Massachusetts, was assessed under the statute and appealed 
from a denial of his petition for abatement of the tax. The principal 
contention was that the imposition of the tax in respect of the vehicles, 
which were used in interstate commerce,s violated the commerce4 and 
due process5 clauses of the United States Constitution. 
Without deciding upon the objective merits of the statute the Su-
preme Judicial Court rejected the contention. It pointed out that the 
statute, even as applied to vehicles that are operated in other states 
as well as in Massachusetts, is not invalid on its face, absent a showing 
that it produced more revenue than was needed to meet the expenses 
of the Commonwealth and its municipalities with reference to high-
ways and the operation of motor vehicles thereon. Thus, even though 
the proceeds of the tax are not earmarked, as are some revenues,6 for 
highway purposes, the excise may find constitutional justification, al-
though applied to vehicles that are operated in interstate commerce, 
as an exaction for the use of the highways of the Commonwealth.7 
Beyond this point, however, the Court refused to consider the car-
rier's contention. It ruled that he had either failed to show injury 
or waived his rights since, for all that appeared in the record, he had 
been under no obligation to register the vehicles with respect to which 
the tax had been assessed. Had he lawfully refrained from registering 
the vehicles, he would not have been subject to the excise on the privi-
lege· of registration. Having voluntarily registered the vehicles, he 
was in no position to complain of the consequent excise. 
The case thus leaves unsettled a serious question as to the validity 
of the statute in a substantial area of its application. The opinion 
cites, in general support of the statute, Capitol Greyhound Lines v. 
Brice,S which sustained a state excise law measured by the value of 
the vehicles (including those from out of state) that were used on the 
state highways. That case, however, is not conclusive of the issues that 
may be raised. 
As the Court pointed out,1I G.L., c. 60A is an excise imposed upon 
motor vehicles in lieu of the property tax imposed upon chattels gen-
erally.10 It has long been held, in the case of railroad rolling stock, 
which may move through many states during the course of a year, that 
, 21959 Mass. Adv. Sh. 631,158 N.E.2d 146. 
3 There was 'also a small intrastate operation of the carrier: 
4 U.S. Const., Art. I, §8, d. 3. 
1I1d., Amend. XIV. 
6 Mass. Const., Amend., Art. LXXVIII. 
71959 Mass. Adv. Sh. 631, 639, 158 N.E.2d 146, 153. 
S 339 U.S. 542, 70 Sup. Ct. 806,94 L. Ed. 1053 (1950). 
II 1959 Mass. Adv. Sh. 631, 638, 158 N.E.2d 146, 153. 
10 G.L., c. 59. §4. Cf. id. §5, d. 35. 
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any given state may impose ~ property tax only upon some portion 
of its value.11 The alternative would be liability to multiple taxation 
of the same value, and this has been held to be violative of due 
process.12 This, it should perhaps be noted, is different from the 
doctrine that would invalidate, in the name of the commerce clause, 
a state tax that is susceptible of duplication elsewhere.13 The latter 
doctrine is applicable to taxes upon the doing of business, as con-
trasted with those upon movable property. 
River boats and barges14 and possibly aircraft Iii have been held to 
be subject to a similar limitation of property taxability. Whether 
there is an exception to this limitation, allowing the domiciliary states 
of railroads and aircraft to tax the full values of the vehicles, has not 
been made explicitly clear.16 That there is no such exception in the 
case of non-oceanic vessels has been established,l7 As to buses that 
operate in more than one state, there appears to be no clear-cut de-
cision as to whether either a domiciliary state or a non-domiciliary 
state must apportion its property taxes. The nearest analogy is to be 
found in two cases, one of which holds that an excise measured by 
valuation of the vehicles apparently need not be apportioned,18 the 
other holding that a tax measured by gross receipts must be appor-
tioned, only those receipts allocable to transportation within the state 
being taxable.19 
In the O'Brien case the Court also refrained from ruling as to 
whether the motor vehicle excise tax, although assessable in lieu of 
property tax, would have to be treated as a property tax, rather than 
an excise for use of the highways, for purposes of resolving federal 
constitutional issues.20 
11 Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194, 26 Sup. Ct. 36, 50 
L. Ed. 150 (1905); Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18, 11 Sup. 
Ct. 876, 35 L. Ed. 613 (1891). 
12 Braniff Airways v. Nebraska Board, 347 U.S. 590, 598·599, 74 Sup. Ct. 757, 762-
763,98 L. Ed. 967,976 (1954); Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U.S. 
194,26 Sup. Ct. 36, 50 L. Ed. 150 (1905). 
13 Aelams Manufacturing Co. v. Storen, 304 U.s. 307, 58 Sup. Ct. 913, 82 L. Ed. 
1365 (1938); Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Kansas ex reI. Coleman, 216 U.S. I, 
30 Sup. Ct. 190,54 L. Ed. 355 (1910). 
14 Standard Oil Co. v. Peck, 342 U.S. 382, 72 Sup. Ct. 309, 96 L. Ed. 427 (1952); 
Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 336 U.S. 169, 69 Sup. Ct. 432, 93 L. Ed. 
585 (1949). 
15 Braniff Airways v. Nebraska Board, 347 U.S. 590, 74 Sup. Ct. 757, 98 L. Ed. 
967 (1954). 
16 Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 64 Sup. Ct. 950, 88 L. Ed. 1283 
(1944); New York ex reI. New York Central Be H.R.R. Co. v. Miller, 202 U.S. 584, 
26 Sup. Ct. 714, 50 L. Ed. 1155 (1906). See T[homasl R[eed] P[owell], Northwest 
Airlines v. Minnesota: State Taxation of Airplanes, 57 Harv. L. Rev. 1097 (1944). 
17 Standard Oil Co. v. Peck, 342 U.S. 382, 72 Sup. Ct. 309, 96 L. Ed. 427 (1952). 
18 Capitol Greyhound Lines v. Brice, 339 U.S. 542, 70 Sup. Ct. 806, 94 L. Ed. 
1053 (1950). 
19 Central Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Mealey, 334 U.S. 653, 68 Sup. Ct. 1260, 92 L. 
Ed. 1633 (1948). 
201959 Mass. Adv. Sh. 631, 642, 158 N.E.2d 146, 155. 
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§9.4. Freedom of expression. The Supreme Judicial Court has ex-
tended its earlier denunciation of official restriction of freedom of 
expression. In 1955 it struck down legislation that would subject ex-
hibition of a motion picture to the discretionary licensing power of an 
officer.l In Commonwealth v. Moniz2 it widened the area of protected 
expression by overriding a jury verdict that a motion picture exhibited 
by the defendants was "obscene, indecent and impure." 3 The film 
depicted activities in a nudist colony and it contained scenes showing 
both men and women unclothed. The Court viewed the film and con-
cluded that, although the jury might accurately have found it deficient 
in meeting contemporary standards of good taste, it could not be found 
to be "obscene" in the sense that it "deals with sex in a manner ap-
pealing to prurient interest." 4 
A few weeks earlier, the Court had, by implication, brought the use 
of radio and television receivers and the playing of records on juke 
boxes within the area of constitutionally protected expression.1i In 
sustaining the provisions of the statute6 which provides for the licens-
ing of entertainment by such devices in restaurants and similar estab-
lishments, it emphasized that the licensing officer had no power of 
censorship of the content of the entertainment, his function being 
limited to that of preserving public order and preventing public nui-
sances.T 
§9.5. Public funds: Incidental private purpose. "Public pur-
pose," the phrase conventionally used to describe the constitutionally 
imposed limitation upon the use to which public funds may be put, 
was expounded and applied in an advisory opinionl and in a decided 
§9.4. 1 Brattle Films, Inc. v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 333 Mass. 58, 127 
N.E.2d 891 (1955); Times Film Corp. v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 333 Mass. 
62, 127 N.E.2d 893 (1955). 
2338 Mass. 442, 155 N.E.2d 762 (1959). 
3 G.L., c. 272, §§28A, 32. There was also an indictment laid under G.L., c. 136, 
§3, which forbids offering entertainment on the Lord's Day unless it is "in keeping 
with the character of the day and not inconsistent with its due observance and 
duly licensed as provided in section four .... " This was not specifically discussed 
in the opinion, but the Court treated the cases under all the indictments as pre-
senting the single issue, whether the film could be found to be obscene. 338 Mass. 
442,443, 155 N.E.2d 762, 763 (1959). 
4 It was in these terms that the Supreme Court of the United States described the 
sort of publication which is not entitled to protection against official suppression 
or punishment. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487, 77 Sup. Ct. 1304, 1310, 
1 L. Ed. 2d 1498, 1508 (1957). 
5 Mosey Cafe, Inc. v. Licensing Board for the City of Boston, 338 Mass. 199, 154 
N.E.2d 585 (1958). 
6 G.L., c. 140, §18l!A, implemented by Revised Ordinances of Boston, c. 40A, 
§I, d. 92 (1947). 
7338 Mass. 199, 204, 154 N.E.2d 585, 590 (1958). The opinion contains an 
informative discussion of the necessity of statutory standards controlling licensing 
officers in their exercise of delegated powers. Cf. Commonwealth v. Maletsky, 20l! 
Mass. 241,89 N.E. 245 (1909). 
§9.5. 1 Opinion of the Justices, 337 Mass. 800,152 N.E.2d 90 (1958). 
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case.2 In the former, after the New Haven Railroad had announced 
its intention to exercise its right, under a bankruptcy reorganization 
plan, to discontinue service on the Old Colony lines serving south~ 
eastern Massachusetts, it was proposed to pay the railroad some $900,-
000 as an inducement to continue service for a year. Part of the con-
sideration for the payment was the railroad's agreement to extend 
an option, which the Commonwealth had under the reorganization 
plan, to purchase parts of the Old Colony lines in the event of dis-
continuance of service by the railroad. The money for the payment 
was to be raised by assessments upon Boston and the other cities and 
towns served by the railroad on the Old Colony lines. The justices 
ruled that the preservation of rail transportation in the area involved 
was a public purpose.3 The proposal was enacted into law.4 
In the Merchants National Bank case the question involved was the 
validity of notes of the City of Boston under legislation5 authorizing 
construction of a municipal auditorium. It was argued that the pro-
posed building was being designed for rental for conventions and 
for an exhibition hall for private exhibitions and shows. The Court, 
however, pointed out that the building was also designed for public 
exercises and hearings, political rallies and exhibitions of a public 
character, such as those in connection with public school and civil de-
defense activities. Provision for the latter uses was, it was held, clearly a 
public purpose not derogated from by the dual character of the build-
ing. The Court apparently felt bound by an earlier precedent6 to 
go on and assert that public uses of the sort indicated would be the 
predominant uses of the building, to which the private uses would be 
but incidental. There is at least a suggestion7 that if, upon construc-
tion of the auditorium, non-public uses should become "dominant" 
the situation would be judicially reviewable. 
§9.6. Equal protection of the laws. In three instances there were 
rulings upon the equal protection clause,! and in each the actual or 
proposed legislation was sustained. 
Mosey Cafe, Inc. v. Mayor of Boston2 grew out of the legislative 
treatment of the Lord's Day statute3 to meet the constitutional ob-
jections raised by the Supreme Judicial Court in 1955.4 The statute 
originally required Sunday licenses for public entertainment which 
consisted of motion picture exhibitions or the use of radio, television 
or juke boxes. The license, issued by the mayor, was subject to the 
2 City of Boston v. Merchants National Bank, 338 Mass. 245, 154 N.E.2d 702 (1959). 
3337 Mass. 800, 805, 152 N.E.2d 90, 93 (1958). 
4 Acts of 1958, c. 541. 
1\ Acts of 1954, c. 164, as amended by Acts of 1957, c. 718. 
6 Wheelock v. Lowell, 196 Mass. 220,81 N.E. 977 (1907). 
7338 Mass. 245, 249,154 N.E.2d 702, 706 (1958). 
§9.6. 1 U.S. Const., Amend. XIV. 
2338 Mass. 207, 154 N.E.2d 591 (1958). This was a companion case to Mosey Cafe, 
Inc. v. Licensing Board, 338 Mass. 199, 154 N.E.2d 585 (1958), discussed in §9,4 supra. 
3 G.L., c. 136, §4. 
4 See §9.4 supra, especially note 1. 
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qualification that the proposed entertainment should have been ap-
proved by the Commissioner of Public Safety "as being in keeping 
with the character of the day and not inconsistent with its due ob-
servance." The 1955 amendment 5 made the qualification inappli-
cable to Sunday licenses for motion pictures, radio and television, but 
left it applicable to Sunday licenses for juke boxes. A holder of a 
Sunday juke box license sued for a declaratory decree that the license 
requirement was invalid as to him. The Court ruled, however, that, 
since the licensing standards went to the type of entertainment, rather 
than to the specific content of the entertainment, it could not be said 
that the classification of juke boxes into one category and of motion 
pictures, radio and television into another for this purpose was un-
reasonable. 
In another casee the selectmen of Brookline had made supplemental 
safety regulationsT applicable to lodging houses and convalescent 
homes, but not to hotels. The Court ruled that "[dJifferences in pur-
pose, use, construction, size and the like afford a rational basis for a 
differentiation between lodging houses and hotels with respect to these 
fire safety regulations." 8 Finally, in an advisory opinion9 the justices 
ruled that there would be no improper classification in a requirement 
that, in any case arising under the Anti-Injunction Act,IO a panel of 
three justices would be assigned to hear and determine the matter. 
The proposed bill was subsequently enacted into law.u 
§9.7. Due process of law. Due process of law was held to be 
denied in Commonwealth v. Page.1 The respondent had been sen-
tenced to a correctional institution following his conviction of crime. 
The day before the expiration of his term the district attorney insti-
tuted proceedings for his commitment under the statute providing 
for the care, treatment and rehabilitation of sex offenders.2 At a hear-
ing before a judge, the respondent's motion for a jury trial was denied 
and, while it apparently was made to appear that the respondent was 
a "sex offender" within the meaning of the statute, it also appeared 
that no treatment center had been established as required by the 
statute. The respondent was committed for an indefinite period to 
the correctional institution, where he was housed with the general 
prison population. The Supreme Judicial Court did not rule directly 
upon the validity of the statute insofar as it provided for involuntary 
5 Acts of 1955, c. 742. 
6 Maher v. Town of Brookline, 1959 Mass. Adv. Sh. 807, 158 N.E.2d 320. For 
a further discussion of this case, see §12.8 infra. 
T As authorized by G.L., c. 143, §46, which provides for local regulations in ad-
dition to the specific safety reqUirements set forth in the statute. 
81959 Mass. Adv. Sh. 807, 811, 158 N.E.2d 320,323. 
9 Opinion of the Justices, 1959 Mass. Adv. Sh. 775, 158 N.E.2d 354. 
10 Acts of 1935, c. 407, as amended, appearing in G.L., c. 149, §§20B, 20C, 24, c. 
150A, and c. 214, §§9A, 9B. 
11 Acts of 1959, c. 600, adding a new §30 to G.L., c. 212. 
§9.7. 11959 Mass. Adv. Sh. 915, 159 N.E.2d 82. 
2 G.L., c. 12M. 
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confinement of "sex offenders" for treatment, except to suggestS that 
it might be analogous to statutes providing for compulsory non-penal 
treatment of mental defectives and "psychopathic personalities."· On 
the record of the Page case, however, it was held that the disposition 
appeared on its face to be penal, rather than remedial, and the con-
finement provisions of the statute could not, consistently with stand-
ards of due process, be executed unless treatment facilities had in fact 
been established. 
Another due process point was raised and rejected in Massachusetts 
Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Commissioner of 
Public Health." A recent statute6 authorizes certain institutions, 
under license from the Commissioner, to requisition impounded lost 
and strayed dogs and cats from their custodians for the purpose of 
scientific investigation, experiment or instruction. Various humane 
societies, which habitually are custodians of such animals and which 
object to the animals being used for the purposes outlined in the stat-
ute, instituted proceedings to prevent enforcement of the statute. 
Their theory was that, as "finders" of the lost and strayed animals in 
their custody, they had property rights in the animals7 of which they 
could not be deprived by requisitions made under the statute. The 
Court, however, pointed out that, whether or not the asserted common 
law doctrine was applicable in favor of the societies, the doctrine itself 
was subject to change by legislation.8 
§9.8. Lord's Day Statute. A United States District Court composed 
of three judgesl held (with one judge dissenting) that the so-called 
Lord's Day Statute2 of Massachusetts was invalid as applied to the 
operator of a kosher market and classes of persons composed of Ortho-
dox Jewish customers of the market and of rabbis who service kosher 
markets in accordance with Jewish dietary laws.3 The case, whose 
pendency was noted a year ago,· ruled that the statute infringes the 
Fourteenth Amendment in that (1) it "is a law respecting the [sic] 
establishment of religion and denying [sic] the free exercise of reli-
gion"; (2) it deprives the market owner of property, and the customers 
and rabbis of liberty, without due process of law; and (3) by reason of 
31959 Mass. Adv. Sh. 915. 917.159 N.E.2d 82. 85 . 
• Minnesota ex reI. Pearson v. Probate Court. !l09 U.S. 270. 60 Sup. Ct. 52!1. 84 
L. Ed. 744 (1940); Dubois. Petitioner. !I!Il Mass. 575. 120 N.E.2d 920 (1954). 
I> 1959 Mass. Adv. Sh. 815. 158 N.E.2d 487. 
8 G.L .• c. 49A. inserted by Acts of 1957. c. 298. noted in 1957 Ann. Surv. Mass. 
Law §!l1.5. 
7 McAvoy v. Medina. II Allen 548 (Mass. 1866). 
81959 Mass. Adv. Sh. 815. 824.158 N.E.2d 487. 494. 
§9.8. 1 The court sat pursuant to 28 U.s.C. §§1!1!11.1!14!1. 2281. 2284 (1952). 
2 The opinion referred generally to G.L .• c. 1!16. but the decision clearly was 
made with reference to Section 5 thereof. 
3 Crown Kosher Super Market of Mass .• Inc. v. Gallagher. 176 F. Supp. 466. sup-
plemental dissenting opinion. 178 F. Supp. !I!I6 (D. Mass. 1959). 
41958 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §11.2 at 1I6. 
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the many exemptions5 from the prohibitions of the statute, it denies 
equal protection of the laws.6 
An appeal has been taken from the decision to the Supreme Court 
of the United States.7 If the Court decides to hear argument and to 
pass upon the constitutional questions presented,S a decision will not 
be forthcoming, in all likelihood, until some time in October Term, 
1960.9 There is pending before the Court an appeal from a decision 
of the Maryland Court of Appeals,10 which sustained a Maryland 
Sunday observance statute against contentions that it involved "an 
establishment of religion" and that it was unlawfully discriminatory. 
More recently, a Pennsylvania Sunday statute was sustained by a three-
judge federal court,u which rejected the reasoning of the court that 
decided the Crown Kosher Super Market case.12 
5 G.L., c. 136, §6. 
8176 F. Supp. 466, 471, 475 (D. Mass. 1959). 
7 Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market, No. 532, October Term, 1959. It was 
erroneously reported, in 28 U.S. Law Week 3173, that a petition for certiorari had 
been filed. 
S Conceivably the case could be disposed of on a jurisdictional issue, as to 
whether the District Court should have declined to act and should have awaited 
a determination of the points by the state court. This was part of the basis of 
the dissent. 176 F. Supp. 466, 479 (D. Mass. 1959). 
11 The Court's schedule for October Term, 1959, will preclude the hearing, at 
this term, of practically all cases in which certiorari is granted or probably juris-
diction noted subsequent to December 14, 1959. 
10 McGowan v. State, - Md. -, 151 A.2d 156 (1959), appeal pending sub nom. 
McGowan v. Maryland, No. 438, October Term, 1959. 
11 Two Guys from Harrison·Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 179 F. Supp. 944 (ED. 
Pa. 1959), noted, 28 U.S. Law Week 1081, summarized, id. 2250 (1959). 
12 Appeal pending, No. 699, and certiorari sought, No. 700, October Term, 1959. 
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